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                                                 ABSTRACT





In Philosophy and Logical Syntax, Carnap talks about the relativity of philosophical theses regarding language:

...a syntactical sentence must refer to one or several specific language-systems; it is incomplete unless it contains  such a reference (...) Very often sterile philosophical controversies arise  through such an incompleteness of theses. This incompleteness is concealed by the usual formulation in the material mode. When translated into the formal mode, the want of reference to language is noticed at once. Then by adding such a reference the theses are complete, and thereby the controversy becomes clear and exact (…). The relativity of all philosophical theses in regard to language, that is, the need of reference to one or several particular language-systems, is a very essential point to keep in mind. It is on account of the general use of the material mode of speech that this relativity is nearly always left unnoticed (CARNAP 1935, pp.77-78)
 
In some passages of his work, Carnap appears to suggest that he would extend this thesis to empirical sentences, to synthetic sentences of empirical science. One of these passages  from Truth and Confirmation  is one of the most frequently quoted passages by revisionists from Carnap’s work in favor of their thesis. In fact, revisionists choose different parts of the paragraph that, in its entirety, says the following: 

Closer attention to these two operations​[1]​ and their mutual relations will help to clarify a number of recently much discussed questions. There has been a good deal of dispute as to whether in the procedure of scientific test​ing statements must be compared with facts or as to whether such com​parison be unnecessary, if not impossible. If ‘comparison of statement with fact’ means the procedure which we called the first operation then it must be admitted that this procedure is not only possible, but even indispensable for scientific testing. Yet it must be remarked that the formulation ‘comparison of statement and fact’ is not unobjectionable. First, the concept ‘comparison’ is not quite appropriate here. Two objects can be compared in regard to a property which may characterize them in various ways (e.g., in regard to color, size, or number of parts, and so on). We therefore prefer to speak of ‘confrontation’ rather than ‘comparison’. Con​frontation is understood to consist in finding out as to whether one object (the statement in this case) properly fits the other (the fact); i.e., as to whether the fact is such as it is described in the statement, or, to express it differently, as to whether the statement is true to fact. Furthermore, ​the formulation in terms of ‘comparison’, in speaking of ‘facts’ or realities’, easily tempts one into the absolutistic view according to which we are said to search for an absolute reality whose nature is assumed as fixed independently of the language chosen for its description. The an​swer to a question concerning reality however depends not only upon that ‘reality’, or upon the facts but also upon the structure (and the set of concepts) of the language used for the description. In translating one language into another the factual content of an empirical statement cannot always be preserved unchanged. Such changes are inevitable if the structures of the two languages differ in essential points. For example: while many statements of modern physics are completely translatable into statements of classical physics, this is not so or only incompletely so with other statements. The latter situation arises when the statement in ques​tion contains concepts (like, e.g., ‘wave-function’ or ‘quantization’) which simply do not occur in classical physics; the essential point being that these concepts cannot be subsequently included since they presuppose a differ​ent form of language. This becomes still more obvious if we contemplate the possibility of a language with a discontinuous spatio-temporal order which might be adopted in a future physics. Then, obviously, some statements of classical physics could not be translated into the new language, and others only incompletely. (This means not only that previously ac​cepted statements would have to be rejected; but also that to certain statements  regardless of whether they were held true or false  there is no corresponding statement at all in the new language) (CARNAP 1949, pp. 125-126).

            Earman comments about it: “Here we have two of the key theses of the “postpositivist” philosophy of science: the nonexistence of neutral facts and incommensurability in the form of failure of intertranslatability” (EARMAN 1993, p. 11).
The same passage is already quoted in COFFA 1977, where the author says: “Note, please, that this is not Kuhn 1962 but Carnap 1935” (p.224). Note, please, that this is said within the very spirit of the current revisionism, though Coffa does not refers there directly to Truth and Confirmation, translated in 1949, but to German original text Wahrheit und Bewährung, published in 1936, based on a communication made in the Paris Congress of Philosophy of Science in 1935. The question is: could the referred text really have the meaning imagined by revisionists and by the ‘precursor’ Coffa, which would make it evident that Carnap had anticipated Kuhn’s ideas or the postpositivism?
I raise this question because, in the volume edited by Schilpp, answering Cohen who has accused him of conventionalism, Carnap refers to this text to emphasize “the non-conventional, objective component in the knowledge of facts”. And he also says: “Cohen believes that my so called principle of tolerance in the logical syntax contains a ‘doctrine of conventionally-chosen basic-truths’. But this is not the case. The principle referred only to the free choice of the structure of the language, and not to the content of synthetic sentences” (SCHILPP 1963, p. 864)​[2]​.

In what follows I shall discuss Truth and Confirmation, trying to put it in the context of Carnap’s work. My intention is to analyze revisionist interpretation on the basis of other texts by Carnap and show that revisionists, while assembling their jigsaw puzzle concerning Carnap’s work, have inadvertently forgotten to consider some pieces of importance in the formation of a theoretically and historically cogent picture. 
I concentrate on Truth and Confirmation for three reasons: 1. As a historian, my attention was attracted to it by Carnap’s reference in the volume edited by Schilpp and quoted above, which is in strong and strange contrast with revisionist interpretation. 2. The text is one Carnap's works most frequently cited by revisionists in favor of their thesis. 3. Truth and Confirmation (1949) is a translation of Wahrheit und Bewährung (1936) and the short excerpt quoted by revisionists  as they interpret it  appears to also present clear inconsistencies with other texts published by Carnap during the same period. 
 
 
2. Wahrheit und Bewährung and Other Essays

In Testability and Meaning, edited at the same time as Wahrheit und Bewährung, Carnap seeks to clarify the reasons why he considers that the “question of truth and verification” of a synthetic sentence is not conventional: 
	
Suppose a sentence S is given, some test-observations for it have been made, and S is confirmed by them in a certain degree. Then it is a matter of practical decision whether we will consider that degree as high enough for our acceptance of S, or as low enough for our rejection of S, or as intermediate between these so that we neither accept nor reject S until further evidence will be available. Although our decision is based upon the observations made so far, nevertheless it is not uniquely determined by them. There is no general rule to determine our decision. Thus the accept​ance and the rejection of a (synthetic) sentence always contains a con​ventional component. That does not mean that the decision  or, in other words, the question of truth and verification  is conventional. For, in ad​dition to the conventional component there is always the non-conventional component  we may call it, the objective one  consisting in the observa​tions which have been made. And it must certainly be admitted that in very many cases this objective component is present to such an overwhelming extent that the conventional component practically vanishes (Carnap 1953, p.49).

It would be convenient to recall Carnap’s reply in the volume edited by Schilpp concerning a text in which Cohen presents his criticism in the following words:

Thus, complete conventionalism, e.g., a relativized basis of empirical knowledge, is fatal to science. It cannot responsibly distinguish facts from ghosts. Its criteria for accepting protocols are as non-empirical as Kant’s synthetic a priori. And conventionalists are constrained to invoke a covertly anti-conventionalist theory of the meaning of historical state​ments when they offer historical interpretations of the causes of scientific agreement. Insofar as any particular empiricist theory of truth embraces or entails a thoroughgoing conventionalist doctrine of coherence, how​ever inadvertently, it must, to that degree, suffer these same inadequacies. The ease with which a partial conventionalist analysis of science can, first, obscure the non-conventional (and essential) components of science, and, then, provide systematic support for subjectivist doctrines, requires that careful conclusions should be drawn concerning the role of conven​tions at all levels of scientific inquiry: facts, concepts, theories, and meta-​scientific reconstructions (pp. 114-115).

Concluding his reply  still talking about Wahrheit und Bewährung  Carnap completely denies his (and Neurath’s) supposed link with the so called coherence theory of truth:
There I also pointed out that the first operation in the testing of synthetic statements is the confrontation of the statement with observed facts. Thereby I took a position clearly opposed to a pure conventionalism and to any coherence theory of truth. My discussion was implicitly meant to correct some form​ulations by Neurath, but not his actual views. He used to say that state​ments should be compared only with statements and not with facts. These formulations were misleading because they seemed, contrary to Neurath’s intention, to represent a coherence conception of truth. They were in​deed repeatedly interpreted in this sense, not only by outsiders like Rus​sell and Ayer, but also by Schlick. Neurath vehemently rejected this in​terpretation in the discussions of the Vienna Circle, and also in a remark in his report on the Paris Congress of 1935 (Erkenntnis, V, 1936, 400). At any rate, there cannot be any doubt that Neurath never held this conception. Still less can it be attributed to me or to “the physical​ists” in general, as critics have sometimes done (SCHILPP 1963, p. 864).

	His purpose is already clear in the original text:

The scruples here advanced regarding the assertion that statements are to be compared with facts (or reality) were directed not so much against its content but rather against its form. The assertion is not false  if only it is interpreted in the manner indicated  but formulated in a potentially misleading fashion. Hence, one must not, in repudiating the assertion, replace it by its denial: “Statements cannot be compared with facts (or with reality)”; for this negative formulation is as much open to objection as the original affirmative one. In repudiating the formulation one must take care not to reject the procedure which was presumably intended, viz., the confrontation with observation. Nor must the significance and in​dispensability of such confrontation be overshadowed by exclusive atten​tion to the second operation. (Besides, the phrase ‘Comparison of state​ments with each other’, instead of ‘confrontation’, seems open to the same objections.) He who really repudiates the first operation  I do not think that anyone in scientifically oriented circles does  could not be con​sidered an empiricist (CARNAP 1949, p. 126)​[3]​.

Perhaps these observations are not sufficient for a clear understanding of Truth and Confirmation (Wahrheit und Bewährung) and neither do they refute revisionists’ interpretation. But I ask: would it make sense for Carnap to draw attention to this text in order to emphasize “the non-conventional, objective component in the knowledge of facts” and the fact that his principle of tolerance referred “only to the free choice of the structure of the language, and not to the content of synthetic sentences” if this text should be interpreted as suggested by revisionists?
Moreover, in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (edited in 1966), Carnap refers in a much broader way to relations between Newton’s and Einstein’s languages than he does in Wahrheit und Bewährung, and in a manner that also seems to differ from revisionist interpretation. In part III, he restricts himself to an analysis of the problem of choice of the structure of language, between the Euclidian and non-Euclidian alternatives concerning space. Given that the non-Euclidian language is not intrinsically linked to Einstein’s theory, neither Euclidian language to the Newton’s theory, Carnap investigates the reasons for a choice between the languages. Indeed, according to him, the choice between the theories has already been decided by empirical means.  
Once the necessary physical adjustments are made, the Euclidian language (which has a simpler geometry) could be chosen in the same way as the non-Euclidian language (which has simpler physics). Indeed, as we can see in Reichenbach’s text quoted below, this free choice of language would also be open in relation to Newtonian theory, only as a logical possibility, since the choice would be trivially solved from a practical point of view. In the case of the theory of relativity there is, on the one hand, physical simplicity and geometrical complexity (with non-Euclidian language), and, on the other hand, geometrical simplicity and physical complexity (with Euclidian language). This differs in the case of Newton’s theory where there would be geometrical and physical simplicity (with Euclidian language) against geometrical and physical complexity (with non-Euclidian language) and therefore the problem of choice between the languages is dissolved.
What is important to emphasize is that according to Carnap a practical choice between two equivalent languages or “two different ways of describing the same totality of facts” (p.153) is at stake: On the one hand, the language of non-Euclidian geometry and, on the other, the language of Euclidian geometry (with the necessary adjustments in physical laws), both of them able to assimilate the “observations that suggest a non-Euclidean space” (p. 154). Such observations would have already decided the matter of intertheoretical choice in physics. Carnap stresses that tests performed in Postdam which produced the first measurements of these displacements “proved to be a dramatic confirmation of Einstein’s theory” (p.159).
The question analyzed by Carnap is well summarized by Reichenbach when he writes​[4]​:
Assume that empirical observations are compatible with the following two descriptions:
CLASS I: (a) The geometry is Euclidean, but there are universal forces distorting light rays and measuring rods. (b) The geometry is non-Euclidean, and there are no universal forces.
Poincaré is right when he argues that each of these descriptions can be assumed as true, and that it would be erroneous to discriminate between them. They are merely different languages describing the same state of affairs.
Now assume that in a different world, or in a different part of our world, empirical observations were made which are compatible with the following two descrip​tions:
CLASS II: (a) The geometry is Euclidean, and there are no universal forces. (b) The geometry is non-Euclidean, but there are uni​versal forces distorting light rays and measuring rods.
Once more Poincaré is right when he argues that these two descriptions are both true; they are equivalent descriptions.
But Poincaré would be mistaken if he were to argue that the two worlds I and II were the same. They are objectively different. Although for each world there is a class of equivalent descriptions, the different classes are not of equal truth value. Only one class can be true for a given kind of world; which class it is, only empirical ob​servation can tell. Conventionalism sees only the equiva​lence of the descriptions within one class, but stops short of recognizing the differences between the classes. The theory of equivalent descriptions, however, enables us to describe the world objectively by assigning empirical truth to only one class of descriptions, although within each class all descriptions are of equal truth value (REICHENBACH 1956, pp. 136-137).

Furthermore, given that one of the ‘later’ Carnap’s texts most frequently quoted by revisionists was published in 1936, it is worth asking if these considerations would also be at odds with what he wrote in Philosophy and Logical Syntax, a contemporary text of Wahrheit und Bewährung. There, Carnap distinguishes between “two concepts of reality”: one concerns “empirical problems of reality”; and another concerns “philosophical problems of Reality” (pp.19 and 21). Carnap writes:

When a zoologist asserts the reality of kangaroos, his assertion means that there are things of a certain sort which can be found and perceived at certain times and places; in other words that there are objects of a certain sort which are elements of the space-time system of the physical world. This asser​tion is of course verifiable; by empirical investigation every zoologist arrives at a positive verification, independent of whether he is a Realist or an Idealist. Between the Realist and the Idealist there is full agreement as to the question of the reality of things of such and such sort, i.e. of the possibility of locating elements of such and such sort in the system of the physical world. The disagreement begins only when the question about the Reality of the physical world as a whole is raised. But this question has no sense, because the reality of anything is nothing else than the possibility of its being placed in a certain system, in this case, in the space-​time-system of the physical world, and such a question has sense only if it con​cerns elements or parts, not if it concerns the system itself (pp.19-20).

It is worth bearing in mind that this passage is a clear echo from Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (1928), where one can read:

Two geographers, a realist and an idealist, who are sent out in order to find out if a mountain that is supposed to be somewhere in Africa is only legendary or if it really exists, will come to the same (positive or negative) result. In physics as well as geography there are certain criteria for the concept of reality in this sense  we want to call it “empirical reality”  which always lead to definite results no matter what the philosophical persuasion of the researcher. The two geographers will come to the same result not only about the existence of the mountain, but also about its other characteristics, namely position, shape, height, etc. In all empirical questions there is unanimity. Hence the choice of a philosophical viewpoint has no influence upon the content of natural science; (this does not mean that it could not have some practical influence upon the activity of the scientist).
There is disagreement between the two scientists only when they no longer speak as geographers but as philosophers, when they give a philosophical interpretation of the empirical results about which they agree. (…)  This divergence between the two scientists does not occur in the empirical domain, for there is complete unanimity so far as the empirical facts are concerned. These two theses which are here in opposition to one another go beyond experience and have no factual content. Neither of the disputants suggests that his thesis should be tested through some joint decisive experiment, nor does any one of them give an indication of the design of an experiment through which his thesis could be supported (CARNAP 1967, pp.333-334).
	
These two texts reveal clearly that, according to Carnap, any two scientists (two physicists, for instance) will be in full agreement as to empirical questions. Carnap does not allow any kind of exemptions to this convergence and does not consider possible difficulties in intertheoretical relations at all. Given this position  so firmly and for long sustained (at least between 1928 and 1935), and besides this, compatible with what he published in 1963 and 1966  would it be feasible to argue that Carnap had changed his position, and defended it only in passing, in Wahrheit und Bewährung? Is not the passage too brief to sustain a supposed radical change of conception in Carnap’s work? Also, in revisionist reading, does it not seem to be isolated as much from Carnap’s later position and retrospective appraisal as it is from its immediate historical context?
Coffa quotes a curious text wrote by Carnap​[5]​ in 1931, where it appears that this “complete unanimity” related to experience is put somewhat under suspicion:

It would be conceivable that each person could make his protocol sentences agree with those of others only with great difficulty or not at all...luckily, in fact we find ourselves in a position to bind together our protocols with those of a hundred other people in a common elaboration. If someone appears who, on the basis of his protocols, builds a science that is not consistent with the one constructed by our hundred people, then we vote him down; we say of him (depend​ing on the circumstances) that he is colorblind, or a poor observer, or a dreamer, or a liar, or a madman. If one found that against our one hundred there is another one hundred with a common science that cannot be unified with ours, then we couldn’t vote them down. In case further research would not  lead to agreement we should accept the fact that different groups possess unalterably diverse scientific systems. Luckily, this is not the case (Apud COFFA 1977, p. 217).

In fact, this is a text in which Carnap imagines and clearly describes a Kuhnian thesis. But he explicitly denies it. The text is merely  a rhetorical ‘thought experiment’ that allows Carnap to show the fortunate situation we find ourselves in relation to experience. This idea is endorsed in the article The Unity of Science, published in German in 1932 and translated into English in 1934 (with an introduction especially written by Carnap): 

The determined value of a physical magnitude in any concrete case is independent not only of the particular sensory field used but also of the choice of the experimenter. In this we have again a fortunate but a contingent fact, viz. the existence of a certain structural correspondences between the protocols series of experi​ences of the various experimenters. A difference of opinion between two observers concerning the length of a rod, the tempera​ture of a body, or the frequency of an oscillation, is never regarded in physics as a subjective and therefore unresolvable disagreement; on the contrary, attempts will always be made to produce agreement on the basis of a common experiment. Physicists believe that agreement can in principle be reached to any degree of exactitude attainable by single investi​gators; and that when such agreement is not found in practice, technical difficulties (imperfection of instruments, lack of time, etc.) are the cause. In all cases hitherto where the matter has been investigated with sufficient thoroughness this opinion has been confirmed. Physical determinations are valid inter-subjectively  (CARNAP 1934, pp. 64-65). 

 The same idea concerning error is also present in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, where Carnap asserts that “we know that singular statements of fact, obtained by observation, are never absolutely certain because we may make errors in our observations” (p.20). And, he adds:

Interestingly enough, although there is no way in which a law can be verified (in the strict sense), there is a simple way it can be falsified. One need find only a single counterinstance. The knowledge of a coun​terinstance may, in itself, be uncertain. You may have made an error of observation or have been deceived in some way. But, if we assume that the counterinstance is a fact, then the negation of the law follows im​mediately (CARNAP 1995, p.21).

In these circumstances I suppose that it would not be absurd to state that Carnap, as much in 1931 and 1934 as in 1966, refers to error in order to explain a possible divergence concerning observation. Anyway, “unalterably diverse scientific systems”  imagined by Carnap in a Kuhnian way, that would spring not from error but rather from systematic differences related to observations  are never stated. According to Carnap, they are a theoretical possibility that, fortunately  for science and human knowledge,  never occur. 
Moreover, would one not expect that Carnap  having imagined and denied in 1931 that “conceivable” incommensurability   in affirming it later, as revisionists wish, really did it at least so clearly and explicitly as before?  But where is Carnap so clear and explicit at the alleged time of affirming it? Would it be in Truth and Confirmation ? But this is not exactly the point that I placed suspicion on by showing that Carnap says he refers to this text to emphasize “the non-conventional, objective component in the knowledge of facts”? And, furthermore, that revisionist interpretation of it seems to be in conflict with other texts written by Carnap in the same historical context?


So, let us return to Carnap’s text quoted at the beginning of this paper. He concludes by saying that

The relativity of all philosophical theses in regard to language, that is, the need of reference to one or several particular language-systems, is a very essential point to keep in mind. It is on account of the general use of the material mode of speech that this relativity is nearly always left unnoticed (CARNAP 1935, pp.77-78) 

There is throughout the text a sharp opposition between the univocal character of the reference system of empirical sentences  “the space-time system of the physical world” (idem, p.20)  and the several languages that may compose each one a system of reference to the syntactic sentences. This distinction is crucial  to the understanding of a difference between science and philosophy in Carnap’s viewpoint. This difference will not allow the application mutatis mutandis to science Carnap’s thesis explicitly supported concerning philosophy. In the text under consideration, he refers to real object-sentences (sentences of empirical science), syntactic sentences (sentences of formal sciences and philosophical sentences expressed in formal mode of speech) and pseudo-object-sentences (philosophical sentences expressed in material mode of speech). The last ones are either syntactical sentences in disguise  with the appearance of real object-sentences  or pseudo-sentences, without cognitive meaning.
Pseudo-object sentences, once translated into formal mode, become syntactic sentences and must be related to a language system. Before translating, the pseudo-object sentences are not associated to a language-system (Cf. p. 80), as if they could, by their false appearance, obtain the exclusive privileges of the real object-sentences, which are all related to the space-time system of the physical world. Carnap writes: 

…in reality they {pseudo-object sentences}refer to syntactical forms, and, specifically, to the forms of the designations of those objects which they appear to deal. Thus these sentences are syntactical sentences in virtue of their content, though they are disguised as object-sentences (CARNAP 1937, p. 285).

 It is the univocal character of the space-time system of the physical world that explains the “complete unanimity” among scientists in relation to empirical questions, whether they be physical, geographical or psychological questions, and the absence of “idle controversies” in science (Cf. CARNAP 1935, p. 69).
The philosophical questions of reality only have sense, for Carnap, as syntactic questions, defined within a certain language system. Thus, metaphysical questions can only be solved or dissolved, according to Carnap, when appropriately translated into a formal mode of speech, in other words, when they have been transformed by logical analysis into syntactic sentences and duly related to a language system. On the other hand, as we have seen, the empirical problems of reality are concerned “to the question of the reality of things of such and such sort”, i.e., to “the possibility of locating elements of such and such sort in the system of the physical world”. On this level, all questions are solvable. The disagreement only starts “when the question about the Reality of the physical world as a whole is raised”, a philosophical question, or pseudo-question about an element that is neither placed in the space-time-system of physical world nor in a certain language system (CARNAP 1935, pp.19-20).






I would sum up my criticism to the revisionists’ interpretation of the relationship between Carnap and Kuhn in the following way:
I believe that, if there are texts that seem to indicate the compatibility of Carnap’s philosophy of science and Kuhn’s philosophy of science (as Wahrheit und Bewährung), there are also good reasons to suspect this stance. I have indicated texts in which this compatibility is difficult to support, some of them in the same historical and theoretical context of Wahrheit und Bewährung, and have offered arguments contrary to the idea that what Carnap admits in regard to philosophy is valid mutatis mutandis to science. I have emphasized this point because, if the compatibility that revisionists desire to reveal were between Carnap’s ideas about philosophy and Kuhn’s ideas about science (without any mediation), this compatibility would be trivial. It would be as trivial as claiming that philosophy, like art and other disciplines, presents intertheoretical conceptual discontinuity. After all, the originality of Kuhn’s work, as he states in the postscript of Structure, could be understood as an extension of this idea to science (Cf. KUHN 1970, p.208).
On the other hand, I don’t believe that the revisionists would intend to support the compatibility thesis between Carnap and Kuhn with the intermediary of thesis that Carnap identify theory with language. He denies explicitly this assumption when states that the Principle of Tolerance “referred only to the free choice of the structure of the language, and not to the content of synthetic sentences” (SCHILPP 1963, p. 864, passage already quoted above) and when he analyses, as we have seen, the question of choice of structure of language, between Euclidian and non-Euclidian languages, for physical theories. 
Besides, I sought to show in another paper (OLIVEIRA 2002) that the affair of the letters from Carnap to Kuhn appears to have been interpreted in a precipitated and equivocal way by revisionists. According to them, the welcome reception of Kuhn’s book would have resulted from the fact that Carnap has considered it “philosophical congenial” (Cf. EARMAN 1993, p.11). This explanation, although plausible at first sight, does not resist further analysis. Against this is the strange fact that Carnap has never made a reference to Kuhn in his work, even to Structure which was after all published in his Encyclopedia. Indeed, Carnap certainly has considered it as a work in the History of Science, to which, in this condition, the Encyclopedia had already reserved space in advance. This would explain both the warm reception of Kuhn’s book in the letters and the Carnap’s total negligence regarding it in his works in Philosophy of Science. 
To conclude, I would add one more off-key note concerning the intentions of the revisionists. In his “Intellectual Autobiography”, Carnap writes:

In order to be more concrete I should like to make some remarks about the state of philosophy at the place where I spent most of my time and could observe it most closely, namely in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago. These remarks are not meant as an objective report, but rather as a description of my personal im​pressions and feelings about what appeared to me as strengths or weak​nesses in the situation. In this department great emphasis was placed on the history of philosophy. More frequently than in most other uni​versities of the country, Ph.D. theses were based on a thorough knowl​edge of the philosophical sources in Greek and Latin of ancient and medieval times. The methodological attitude toward the history of philosophy which the students learned was characterized by a thorough study of the sources and by emphasis on the requirement that the doc​trine of a philosopher must be understood immanently, that is, from his own point of view, inasmuch as a criticism from outside would not do justice to the peculiarity of the philosopher in question and his place in the historical development. This education in historical care​fulness and a neutral attitude seemed to me useful and proper for the purpose of historical studies, but not sufficient for training in philosophy itself. The task of the history of philosophy is not essentially different from that of the history of science. The historian of science gives not only a description of the scientific theories, but also a critical judgment of them from the point of view of our present scientific knowledge. I think the same should be required in the history of philosophy. This view is based on the conviction that in philosophy, no less than in science, there is the possibility of cumulative insight and therefore of progress in knowledge. This view, of course, would be rejected by his​toricism in its pure form (SCHILPP 1963, p.41).
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^1	  Carnap refers to “confrontation of a statement with a observation” and “confrontation of a statement with previously accepted statements” (Cf. CARNAP 1949, pp.124-125).
^2	  In all quotations in this paper, the bold fonts are mine.
^3	  Hempel shows to be in fully agreement with Carnap about this in HEMPEL 2000, pp.196-198.
^4	  Nevertheless, Carnap does not agree with Reichenbach’s criticism to Poincaré (Cf.. CARNAP 1995, p. 160).
^5	  Erwiderung auf die vorstehenden Aufsäsatze von E. Zilzel und K. Duncker. In Erkenntnis, 2, 1931.
